In accordance with most contemporary psychoceramicists, I reject the Hegelian distinction between historicism and empiricism, preferring (perhaps somewhat ironically) a synthesis of the two based on the idea that Truth can be examined through a postdeconstructionalist lens when we assume the ideality of both the observer (Marx's poet) and the observed. However, feminism (interpreted in a neoreactionary sense) fails these criteria, as the ideality of such a radically diverse set of principles as have been displayed by feminism throughout time precludes the possibility of an idealistic interpretation. It has been argued, perhaps with some merit, that the neoreactionary view of feminism is far too broad to be useful (or even to hold any meaning, given it lumps the radically different gender dynamics Plato's [i]Republic[/i] in the same "feminist" boat as Audre Lorde's theory), and that therefore the systematic definition of feminism is valid, meaning, of course, ideality is met. I reject this notion on predeontological grounds, arguing that the core concepts of feminism are ill-defined and nebulous even when we exclude Classical ideas of feminism, meaning that the systematic definition forsakes the innumerable benefits of a neoreactionary interpretetation without accomplishing its purported goals. In short, feminism cannot be examined through a postdeconstructuralist lens, so we must choose either a historicist or empiricist interpretation of the philosophy. I think I am not too presumptive in saying that an empiricist approach would be fruitless, so we must therefore approach this problem through historicism, as regrettable as this might seem. Now, onto the tricky question: does feminism truly function as a antithesis in a Hegelian sense, or is it instead the result of other antitheses? My sympathies lie with the latter position, given that feminism was closely preceded by usurping cultural dynamics such as those described by Carberry et al. that challenged prevailing conservative ideals in such a way that the rise of deconstructionist aesthetic cultural pedagogies, and therefore feminism, were inevitable. Stone's work would seem to support this idea, as the failure of submodernist societal ideals has been closely tied with the decline of pataphysical advances - a critical driving force for any social movement as revolutionary as feminism. To take an excerpt from my Honors thesis: [quote]We therefore see that the rise of metaphysical and pataphysical innovations are, invariably, the driving force for social philosophies that challenge traditional kyriarchy. Indeed, when pressured by the prevailing zeitgeists of modern liberalism, postmodern conceptions of kyriarchal ideals reveal themselves to be on weak metaphysical grounds - a prime target for any movement aiming to capitalize on populist persuasions and metaphysical revolutions. I will not address the ethicality or intellectual integrity of such an approach here, but suffice it to say that the utilization of concepts like antinomy and clinamen to address social issues should be, at the very least, met with extreme skepticism by those desiring to maintain an cogent and integrated worldview [/quote]